A series of theoretical studies devoted to understanding law in its full normative complexity — in its foundational structure, in its expression through rights and constitutional reasoning, and in its institutional articulation across competing authorities and jurisdictions.
Three volumes · In preparation
The title Law’s Inner Constitution is purposefully double. In its first sense, it names the inner constitution of law as a normative order: the inherent conditions that constitute law as such, sustain its irreducible claim to rational justification, and distinguish it from mere power or social fact. In its second sense, it invokes constitutional law as the domain in which law’s normative commitments meet the institutional realities of decision-making, adjudication, and multi-level authority. Both senses are integral to the project.
Each volume addresses a distinct domain. Together, they form a coherent inquiry into law’s normative foundations, its theory of rights, and its institutional structure.
The series is united by four guiding commitments: a non-positivist understanding of law as uniting factual authority and normative aspiration; the conviction that legal argumentation is a rational and structurally analysable practice; the theory of constitutional rights as grounded in principled proportionality and balancing; and an institutionally sensitive account of how competing legal authorities can achieve concordance without sacrificing normative rigour. In method, the series is consistently normative-analytical. In ambition, it pursues the project of analytical liberalism and the ideal of reason institutionalised.